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Abstract.	 We	 motivate	 the	 possibility	 of	 using	 notions	 and	 methods	 derived	from	quantum	physics,	 and	more	 specifically	 from	 the	 research	 field	known	as	‘quantum	 cognition’,	 to	 optimally	 model	 different	 situations	 in	 the	 field	 of	medicine,	 its	 decision-making	 processes	 and	 ensuing	 practices,	 particularly	 in	relation	 to	 chronic	 and	 rare	 diseases.	 This	 also	 as	 a	way	 to	 devise	 alternative	approaches	to	the	generally	adopted	double-blind	gold	standard.			Human	 decision	 and	 its	 ensuing	 practices	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 many	domains	 of	 human	 endeavor.	 When	 decisions	 are	 taken	 such	 that	 their	consequences	 are	 determinative	 for	 the	 health	 and	 care	 of	 sick	 people,	 an	element	of	even	greater	importance	is	added.	However,	if	compared	to	decision	making	in	economics,	psychology,	cognitive	science,	or	finance,	medical	decision	making	 has	 not	 yet	 concentrated	 very	 much	 on	 structured	 decision	 model	building	 [1,	 2,	 3,	 4]1.	 Several	 reasons	 for	 this	 can	 be	 identified.	 First	 of	 all,	decisions	in	medicine	touch	upon	some	of	the	most	delicate	and	valued	aspects	of	us	as	human	beings,	possibly	also	related	to	matters	of	life	and	death,	and	for	this	 a	 structured	 theoretical	 modeling	 of	 their	 processes	 might	 seem	 almost	impossible	 [5,	 6,	 7,	 8,	 9].	 Secondly,	 very	 complicated	 ethical	 questions	 are	connected	 with	 even	 simple	 decisions	 and	 their	 subsequent	 practices	 in	medicine,	which	 also	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 only	 highly	 contextual	 and	 ad	 hoc	reasoning	 is	 at	 place	 [10,	 11,	 12].	 Thirdly,	 and	 more	 generally,	 the	 concrete																																																									1	Although	we	mention	that	the	‘Society	for	Medical	Decision	Making’	(http://smdm.org),	with	its	peer	reviewed	journal,	is	an	important	forum	for	many	of	the	delicate	aspects	related	to	medical	decision	making.	
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situations	appearing	with	respect	to	decision-making	and	its	associated	practices	in	medicine	 confront	 aspects	 that	 are	 intrinsically	 extremely	 complex,	 not	 yet	well	 understood,	 and	 possibly	 also	 paradoxical,	 when	 viewed	 from	 a	 certain	perspective.	We	think	here,	for	example,	of	the	ethical	issues	arising	with	the	use	of	placebo	controls	in	clinical	trials	[10],	and	other	types	of	problems,	of	different	nature,	 related	 to	 clinical	 research	 in	 general	 [11,	 12].	 	We	 also	 think	 of	 those	decisions	taking	into	account	several	clinical	trials	testing	the	same	illness,	which	often	 do	 not	 converge	 because	 of	 the	 inherent	 complex	 unpredictability	 [12].	And,	finally,	we	think	of	the	placebo	effect	as	a	general	phenomenon,	indicating	that	there	are	aspects	of	the	medical	practice	that	can	themselves	influence	in	a	not	 yet	 understood	 way	 the	 state	 of	 health	 or	 illness	 of	 the	 patients	 who	 are	subjected	to	them	[13,	14,	15,	16].		The	above-mentioned	complexities	mask	in	some	way	the	deeper	structure	of	decision-making	and	its	ensuing	practices	 in	medicine,	so	that	 it	seems	difficult	to	 conceive	 of	 a	 theory	 general	 enough	 to	 provide	 a	 realistic	 modeling.	 We	believe,	however,	that	such	a	theory	is	possible,	and	that	a	version	of	it	already	exists,	 applied	 to	 other	 domains	 such	 as	 economics,	 finance,	 psychology	 and	cognitive	science.	It	is	called	‘quantum	cognition’	and	its	structure	is	inspired	by	the	 mathematical	 models	 of	 quantum	 theory	 [17,	 18,	 19,	 20,	 21,	 22].	 That	quantum	 structure	 can	 also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 modeling	 of	 human	 decision-making	 in	medicine	 should	 however	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise.	 Indeed,	we	 know	that	 one	 of	 the	 major	 fingerprints	 of	 quantum	 theory	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 an	intrinsic	 and	 irreducible	 influence	 of	 the	measurement	 process	 on	 the	 state	 of	the	entity	under	study,	often	referred	to	as	an	‘observer	effect’	[23].	If	we	think	again	 of	 the	 general	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 placebo	 effect,	 it	 incorporates	 exactly	this	 type	of	 influence	of	 the	medical	practice	on	the	state	of	health	or	 illness	of	the	patient.	As	an	example,	we	can	mention	the	not	commonly	known	fact	 that	even	when	patients	are	informed	that	they	are	being	treated	with	a	placebo,	an	effect	still	remains	present	[16].		Another	phenomenon	more	directly	 related	 to	 the	 thought	 processes	 taking	place	during	medical	decisions,	which	has	been	extensively	studied	in	quantum	cognition,	 is	 the	 so-called	 ‘conjunction	 fallacy’.	 It	 consists	 in	 estimating	 the	probability	of	the	joint	occurrence	of	two	events	to	be	higher	than	the	probability	of	 occurrence	 of	 only	 one	 of	 the	 two	 events	 [24].	 The	 effect	 is	 called	 ‘double	conjunction	 fallacy’	 if	 the	 probability	 of	 joint	 occurrence	 of	 the	 two	 events	 is	estimated	to	be	higher	than	that	of	both	individual	events.	In	classical	probability	theory,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 Boolean	 logic,	 the	 probability	 of	 occurrence	 of	 the	conjunction	 of	 two	 events	 is	 always	 smaller	 or	 equal	 to	 the	 probability	 of	occurrence	 of	 only	 one	 of	 the	 two	 events,	 which	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 the	phenomenon	is	indicated	as	a	‘fallacy’,	meaning	an	‘error	in	reasoning’	[24].		In	the	original	article	where	the	phenomenon	was	identified,	an	example	of	a	conjunction	 fallacy	 occurring	 in	 medicine	 was	 already	 given	 [24].	 More	specifically,	it	was	observed	that	internists	responded	that	a	55-year-old	woman	was	 more	 likely	 to	 experience,	 following	 a	 blockage	 of	 an	 artery	 in	 the	 lungs	(pulmonary	 embolism),	 the	 conjunction	 of	 ‘shortness	 of	 breath	 (dyspnea)	 and	weakness	 in	one	side	of	 the	body	(hemiparesis)’,	 than	 ‘weakness	 in	one	side	of	the	body’.	A	simple	reasoning	using	elementary	logic	shows	why	the	conjunction	fallacy’s	 phenomenon	 is	 a	 fallacy	 of	 classical	 probability	 theory.	 Indeed,	
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whenever	the	woman	in	question	has	‘shortness	of	breath	and	weakness	in	one	side	 of	 the	 body’,	 she	 obviously	 also	 has	 ‘weakness	 in	 one	 side	 of	 the	 body’.	Hence,	 the	 probability	 of	 occurrence	 of	 the	 former	must	 always	 be	 smaller	 or	equal	 to	 the	 probability	 of	 occurrence	 of	 the	 latter.	Why	 then	 people	 do	make	abundantly	 this	 error,	 leading	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 conjunction	 fallacy?	Quantum	cognition	offers	a	new	perspective	on	this	question.	Indeed,	in	addition	to	 being	 a	 new	 physical	 theory,	 quantum	mechanics	 also	 contains	 a	 new	 non-classical	probability	model,	and	within	the	structure	of	the	quantum	probability	model	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 conjunction	 fallacy	 can	 occur	 without	 it	 being	considered	to	be	an	error,	but	a	direct	consequence	of	its	particular	structure.		In	 our	 Brussels	 approach	 to	 quantum	 cognition,	 we	 have	 studied	 in	 great	detail	a	phenomenon	very	similar	to	the	conjunction	fallacy,	which	is	referred	to	as	the	‘pet-fish	problem’,	or	the	‘guppy	effect’.	It	was	identified	in	psychology	in	the	 domain	 of	 ‘concept	 research’	 even	 before	 the	 conjunction	 fallacy	 was	introduced	[25].	It	consists	in	observing	that	‘guppy’,	or	‘goldfish’,	are	considered	to	be	more	 typical	of	a	 ‘pet-fish’	 than	of	only	a	 ‘pet’,	or	only	a	 ‘fish’.	Hence,	 the	feature	 of	 ‘typicality’	 behaves	 weirdly	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 conjunction,	 in	 the	sense	 that	 the	 conjunction	 ‘pet-fish’	 rates	 higher	 in	 typicality	 than	 the	 single	components	‘pet’	and	‘fish’,	for	specific	entities	such	as	a	‘guppy’	or	a	‘gold-fish’.	In	our	Brussels	group,	we	have	worked	out	quantum	models	for	the	guppy	effect	in	great	detail,	and	we	believe	that	it	is	an	archetype	for	what	happens	when	the	conjunction	fallacy	manifests	in	experimental	situations,	leading	to	a	much	better	understanding	of	 the	phenomenon	 than	 in	 traditional	 explanations,	where	 it	 is	merely	 classified	 as	 a	 probability	 judgment	 error	 [26,	 27,	 28,	 29].	 This	 also	because,	a	much	less	known	probabilistic	variant	of	the	original	pet-fish	problem,	using	 ‘membership	 weights’	 instead	 of	 ‘typicalities’,	 has	 also	 been	 abundantly	tested,	giving	rise	to	analogous	behaviors	for	the	conjunction	[30,	31,	32].	It	 is	 by	 means	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 modeling	 techniques,	 which	 we	developed	to	address	the	conjunction	fallacy	and	the	pet-fish	problem	in	human	cognition,	 that	 we	 want	 to	 investigate	 similar	 effects	 that	 can	 appear	 in	 the	medical	practice.	We	observed	that	the	conjunction	fallacy	has	been	studied	very	little	 in	 relation	 to	 medical	 thought,	 though	 considering	 the	 importance	 of	medical	decisions	one	would	have	imagined	differently.	The	pet-fish	variant	of	it	has	not	yet	been	considered	at	all.	We	found	one	article	where	it	 is	shown	that	half	 of	 early	 medical	 students	 estimated	 the	 probability	 that	 a	 patient	 with	 a	common	cold	would	experience	the	symptoms	of	‘runny	nose	and	diarrhea’	to	be	higher	 than	 that	 of	 the	 patient	 experiencing	 the	 symptom	 of	 ‘diarrhea’	 [33].	However,	 we	 also	 found	 a	 very	 recent	 and	 thorough	 investigation	 where	 an	impressive	amount	of	data	was	obtained,	showing	the	occurrence	of	the	double	conjunction	 fallacy	 in	 a	 systematic	way	 in	medicine	 [34].	 The	data	 collected	 in	this	work	interests	us	particularly,	because,	as	the	authors	themselves	recognize,	there	 are	 actually	 no	 convincing	 models	 of	 decision-making	 for	 the	 double	conjunction	fallacy	[35,	36,	37,	38,	39].	This	is	the	reason	why	the	latter	is	often	believed	to	only	appear	very	sporadically,	hence	not	being	representative	of	the	mechanism	 at	 play	 in	 a	 human	 mind	 when	 a	 conjunction	 fallacy	 occurs.	 The	authors	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 study	 disagree	 with	 this	 view	 and	 claim	 that	their	 experiments	 show	 that	double	 conjunction	 fallacies	 are	no	 exception	 and	appear	 abundantly	 whenever	 some	 specific	 cognitive	 situations	 arise.	What	 is	
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interesting	 is	 that	 in	 the	 quantum	 model	 of	 the	 pet-fish	 situation	 that	 we	developed	 in	our	 group	 [17,	 26,	 27,	 28,	 29],	 the	 single	 and	double	 conjunction	fallacies	 can	 be	 modeled	 in	 a	 very	 natural	 way,	 and	 result	 both	 from	 a	 same	fundamental	mechanism,	which	we	plan	to	use	also	as	an	explanation	for,	and	to	further	the	analysis	of,	the	situations	put	forward	in	[34].	Having	 said	 that,	 we	 would	 like	 now	 to	 mention	 a	 situation	 where	 the	application	 of	 quantum	 statistics	 –	 the	 probabilistic	 formalism	 of	 quantum	mechanics	–	would	be	of	specific	value	in	possibly	providing	an	alternative	to	the	double-blind	 gold	 standard	 of	 evidence-based	 medicine	2.	 Chronic	 diseases,	 in	particular	if	they	are	only	vaguely	diagnosed,	pose	a	special	challenge	to	the	gold	standard	of	 evidence-based	medicine.	 Indeed,	 the	 ethical	 and	 technical	 aspects	that	are	related	to	its	corner	stone,	which	is	the	final	placebo-controlled	trial,	can	many	 times	pose	almost	 insurmountable	obstacles.	How	can	one	 treat	a	whole	group	 of	 chronically	 ill	 patients,	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 in	 a	 placebo	well	 controlled	trial,	without	doing	some	harm	to	the	placebo	group	[40]?	Also,	chronic	diseases	lend	themselves	better	than	any	other	category	of	diseases	to	statistical	analysis,	considering	that	they	evolve	over	a	long	period	of	time.	A	thorough	study	of	data	collected	 from	people	who	 suffer	 from	 chronic	 disease	would	 therefore	 be	 the	perfect	starting	point	for	applying	quantum	statistics	to	medicine.		There	are	other	aspects	that	make	chronic	diseases	particularly	suitable	for	a	deep	 analysis	 by	means	 of	 quantum	 statistics,	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 double-blind	 gold	 standard	 of	 evidence-based	 medicine.	 Patients	 who	 suffer	 from	 a	chronic	disease	often	have	a	lot	of	diversified	data	to	submit,	since	they	usually	have	tried	out	several	therapies,	depending	on	the	ups	and	downs	of	their	health	conditions.	These	patients	are	often	also	prepared	to	actively	participate	 in	 the	production	of	an	even	wider	variety	of	data	concerning	their	state	of	health.	Also,	they	are	often	actively	engaged	in	their	disease	processes,	have	read	about	them,	searched	information	on	the	World-Wide	Web,	participated	in	patients’	forums,	etc.	 All	 these	 are	 aspects	 that	 favor	 a	 statistical	 investigation,	 at	 least	 if	 the	statistical	tools	used	are	able	to	take	into	account	all	these	self-induced	aspects	of	the	patients	as	a	consequence	of	their	active	attitude	towards	different	aspects	of	their	diseases.	This	ability	of	managing	self-induced	aspects	in	a	way	that	the	results	obtained	from	the	statistics	are	still	reliable	 is	exactly	one	of	the	salient	characteristics	and	highlights	of	quantum	statistics.	There	is	a	second	category	of	diseases	which	we	would	like	to	also	take	into	account,	 namely	 the	 so-called	 ‘rare	 diseases’	 and/or	 ‘orphan	 diseases’.	 For	different	 reasons	 than	 the	 chronic	 ones,	 they	 also	pose	 special	 challenges	with	respect	 to	 the	 gold	 standard	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 in	 medical	 research,	 which	consists	of	having	a	medicament	pass	the	series	of	type	0,	I,	II,	III	and	IV	trials	on	human	 subjects,	 ending	 in	 a	 double-blind	 placebo-controlled	 experiment	 [41].																																																									2	The	 term	 ‘gold	 standard’	 usually	 refers	 to	 a	 (randomized)	 double-blind	 clinical	 trial,	the	 latter	 being	 an	 experiment	 that	 has	 been	 planned	 and	 designed	 to	 test	 the	efficacy/effectiveness	of	a	 treatment,	by	observing	 its	effects	 in	a	group	of	patients,	by	comparison	with	those	observed	in	a	similar	group	of	patients	only	receiving	a	control	(placebo)	 treatment.	 Blinding	 refers	 to	 the	 masking	 of	 information	 about	 the	 test,	 in	order	 to	 reduce	 or	 eliminate	 possible	 biases	 (e.g.,	 preferences,	 expectations),	 and	 a	double-blinding	 corresponds	 to	 the	 situation	 where	 both	 the	 patients	 and	 the	investigators	are	blind.		
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Indeed,	after	a	medicine	has	succeeded	in	passing	the	initial	research	phases	of	development	 in	 vitro	 and	 the	 trials	 on	 animals,	 subsequent	 trials	 on	 humans	need	 to	 take	place	 in	 a	hospital,	 instead	of	 a	 research	 laboratory	 environment,	and	therefore	are	much	more	expensive	than	the	trials	of	the	preceding	phases.	For	 this	 reason,	 they	usually	 fall	outside	 the	 financial	 reach	of	 research	groups	that	are	often	located	at	universities,	but	they	also	fall	outside	of	the	interest	of	the	 pharmaceutical	 companies,	 which	 for	 non-rare-diseases	 will	 instead	customarily	 finance	 these	extra	 costs	 for	 the	 trials	on	humans,	 considering	 the	earning	prospects	 in	 sales	 of	 the	 tested	medicament.	 For	 orphan	diseases,	 this	‘gold	standard	testing’	of	new	medicaments	frequently	breaks	down,	because	the	turnover	that	can	be	generated	is	too	meager.		Another	 challenge	 for	 rare	diseases,	which	 in	 some	 cases	 can	 even	be	more	serious,	 is	 to	 find	a	sufficiently	 large	group	of	patients	who	can	participate	 in	a	gold	standard	approach.	As	a	consequence,	very	often	 the	development	of	new	medicaments	 for	 rare	 diseases	 stops	 even	 before	 they	 are	 tested	 on	 human	subjects	[42,	43].	As	a	result	of	the	sporadic	nature	of	most	of	these	diseases,	a	direct	application	of	standard	statistical	methods	is	clearly	not	straightforward,	but	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 more	 could	 be	 learned	 about	 them	 by	studying	 how	 to	 optimally	 use	 quantum	 statistical	 methods	 in	 these	 less	favorable	situations,	particularly	once	the	full	potential	of	quantum	statistics	has	become	 better	 understood	 in	 applications	 to	 chronic	 diseases.	 In	 other	words,	rare/orphan	 diseases,	 due	 to	 their	 intrinsic	 limitations	 with	 respect	 to	 the	double-blind	 gold	 standard,	 could	 profit	 from	 quantum	 statistical	 methods,	although	this	can	realistically	happen	only	in	a	later	stage,	after	more	experience	and	 results	 have	 been	 gathered	 with	 the	 more	 favorable	 situation	 of	 chronic	diseases.	Coming	back	to	the	latter,	on	top	of	the	complications	of	 long-term	decision-making	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 question	 of	 ‘how	 to	 reach	 the	 best	 possible	medical	practice’,	with	respect	to	chronic	diseases	one	is	also	confronted	with	the	strange	effect	called	‘the	disability	paradox’.	More	specifically,	many	people	with	serious	and	persistent	disabilities	report	that	they	experience	a	good	or	excellent	quality	of	 life,	 whereas	 to	 most	 external	 observers	 these	 individuals	 seem	 to	 live	 an	undesirable	 daily	 existence	 [44,	 45,	 46,	 47,	 48].	 This	 disability	 paradox	 shows	how	the	phenomenon	of	chronic	disease,	as	a	consequence	of	its	deep	and	long-standing	influence	on	the	life	of	an	individual,	confronts	the	‘quality	of	life	state’	with	the	‘normality	of	life	state’,	and	the	fact	that	they	are	not	a	priori	equal.		Up	to	here,	we	have	considered	quantum	cognition	mainly	with	respect	to	the	new	quantum	statistics	 it	 incorporates,	but	 it	additionally	provides	a	new	non-classical	paradigm	 for	 the	conceptual	and	cognitive	world,	being	able	 to	model	contexts	and	their	effects	on	the	state	of	an	entity	in	a	very	refined	and	powerful	way.	Our	hypothesis	is	that	a	quantum	cognition	approach,	and	more	specifically	the	 operational-realistic	 formalism	 developed	 in	 our	 Brussels’	 group	 [49,	 50],	can	shed	new	light	and	powerful	explanations	on	paradoxical	situations	like	the	disability	 paradox,	 or	 the	 placebo	 effects,	 and	 more	 generally	 on	 the	phenomenon	of	disease	processes	which	 themselves	 can	 influence	 (and	can	be	influenced)	 by	 the	 state	 of	 the	 patients,	 for	 instance	 as	 regards	 the	 perceived	quality	of	 their	 life.	 Indeed,	next	 to	providing	a	non-classical	probability	model	giving	 rise	 to	 a	 quantum	 statistics,	 quantum	 theory	 provides,	 as	 we	 said,	 a	
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powerful	 scheme	 to	 model	 contexts	 and	 their	 influence	 on	 the	 states	 of	 the	entities	 that	 are	 subjected	 to	 them.	 It	 is	 also	 this	 aspect	 of	 quantum	 cognition	that	we	plan	to	explore	in	our	study	of	medical	situations	like	those	described	in	the	disability	paradox.	More	 generally,	 and	 on	 a	 theoretical	 level,	 notions	 such	 as	 ‘context’,	‘emergence’	 and	 ‘interference’,	 none	 of	 which	 can	 be	 modeled	 by	 approaches	inspired	 by	 classical	 theories	 (such	 as	 ‘fuzzy	 sets	 theory’,	 for	 example),	 can	instead	be	addressed	by	the	existing	quantum	cognition	formalisms,	which	is	the	reason	why	 very	 complex	 situations,	 apparently	 only	 allowing	 ad	 hoc	models,	can	be	approached	at	a	deeper	foundational	level	[17,	18,	19,	20,	21,	49,	50].	We	are	 thus	 confident	 that	 advantages	 similar	 to	 those	 encountered	 in	 economics,	finance,	 psychology	 and	 cognitive	 science	 will	 also	 be	 revealed	 if	 these	 new	formalisms	are	applied	to	the	domain	of	medicine,	 to	 investigate	situations	 like	those	mentioned	above,	and	possibly	many	others	as	well.	On	 a	 practical	 level,	 guided	 by	 the	 theoretical	 structure	 of	 these	 quantum	cognition	formalisms,	we	plan	to	develop	and	then	use	the	statistical	models	they	subtend	 to	 a	 point	 where	 direct	 studies	 of	 individual	 cases,	 for	 example	 of	chronically	ill	patients,	could	become	complementary	to	those	based	on	the	gold	standard	 of	 evidence-based	 medicine,	 and	 even	 substitute	 them	 in	 those	situations	where	they	are	almost	not	applicable,	for	ethical,	technical	or	financial	reasons.	 Since	 the	 quantum	 statistics	 derived	 from	 quantum	 cognition	models	are	in	principle	capable	of	also	incorporating	the	effects	of	the	medical	treatment	on	 the	 state	 of	 health	 or	 illness	 at	 a	 fundamental	 level,	 there	 is	 indeed	 the	possibility	 to	 develop	 a	 completely	 new	way	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 placebo	effect,	such	that	quantum	statistical	analysis	of	large	enough	data	might	become	a	 substitute	 for	 the	double-blind	placebo	 trials,	 allowing	 for	 results	of	possibly	equal,	if	not	even	superior,	scientific	quality.		To	 conclude,	 we	 plan	 to	 apply	 quantum	 inspired	 methods	 to	 a	 variety	 of	medical	 situations,	 to	 extract	meaningful	 information	 about	 them	and	possibly	also	better	understand	 the	mechanisms	underlying	 them,	starting	 for	 this	 from	the	large	sets	of	data	about	chronic	diseases	and	the	patients	that	are	affected	by	them,	 then	 continuing,	 possibly,	with	 the	much	 smaller	 sets	 of	 data	 about	 rare	diseases.	And	of	course,	in	case	the	research	program	we	have	here	outlined	–	in	which	 we	 encourage	 the	 community	 of	 quantum	 cognitivist	 scientists	 to	participate	–	will	prove	to	be	successful,	its	benefits	will	also	be	for	the	non-rare	and	 non-chronic	 diseases,	 by	 possibly	 reducing	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 double-blind	tests	also	 for	 them,	with	the	additional	beneficial	effect	 that	smaller	companies	will	 be	 able	 to	 better	 compete	 and	 propose	 innovative	 medicaments,	 in	 a	pharmaceutical	 marketplace	 which	 is	 today	 dangerously	 dominated	 by	 the	multinational	corporations.			
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